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I. INTRODUCTION 
 “Environmental injustice/racism” is the disproportionately 
high level of risk to high-impact environmental hazards that 
certain communities or human groups, particularly people of color, 
in the United States face.1 As of 2014, 134 million U.S. residents 
live within the “vulnerability” zones (estimates made by a facility 
of the maximum possible radius where people could be harmed by 
a worst-case release of certain toxic or flammable chemicals under 
EPA’s Risk Management Planning program) of 3,433 chemical 
facilities.2 Of these 134 million residents, 3.8 million residents live 
within the “fenceline” zones (which are areas designated as one-
tenth the radial distance of the vulnerability zone) closest to 
potential harm from these facilities with the least time to react in 
the event of a catastrophe.3 The percentage of African Americans 
in fenceline zones is 75% greater than for the U.S. as a whole, and 
the percentage of Latinos in fenceline zones is 60% greater than for 
the U.S. as a whole.4 Additionally, the poverty rate within 
fenceline zones is 50% higher than for the U.S. as a whole.5 These 
statistics—and environmental injustice/racism generally—reflect 
the unfair treatment and lack of involvement of certain groups 
based on their race, color, national origin, or income in “the 
 
1. Environmental Justice/Environmental Racism, ENERGY JUSTICE NETWORK, 
https://perma.cc/2LPQ-CC2V; Environmental (in)justice, EJOLT, 
https://perma.cc/X6AG-Q8PN. 
2. ORUM ET AL., ENVTL. JUSTICE & HEALTH ALL. FOR CHEM. POL’Y REFORM, WHO’S 
IN DANGER? RACE, POVERTY, AND CHEMICAL DISASTERS - A DEMOGRAPHIC 
ANALYSIS OF CHEMICAL DISASTER VULNERABILITY ZONES 1–2 (2014), 
https://perma.cc/3JXZ-E9CG. 
3. Id. at 1–2, 11. 
4. Id. at 3. 
5. Id. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss1/3
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development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental 
laws, regulations, and policies.”6 
The water crisis in Flint, Michigan is an example of 
environmental injustice/racism and its poignant relevance to many 
environmental issues the United States faces in the twenty-first 
century. Situated sixty-six miles northwest of Detroit, Flint has a 
population of 99,802 as of 2015—55.1% African American, 39.5% 
White, 3.7% Hispanic or Latino, 0.6% Native American, 0.4% 
Asian, and 0.7% other races.7 Based on this demographic 
breakdown, it is evident that Flint is predominately African 
American. In the wake of the Flint water crisis, many Flint 
residents filed a class action suit in federal district court (in the 
Eastern District of Michigan): Mays v. Snyder.8 The case was 
recently dismissed without prejudice by the district court,9 but 
after the Flint residents filed an appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals,10 the Sixth Circuit consolidated the case with another 
similar case, reversed the dismissal, and remanded to the district 
court for further adjudication on the merits.11 Neither party has 
appealed the decision.12 Plaintiffs—thousands of Flint residents 
affected by the water crisis—have sued multiple government 
 
6. Learn About Environmental Justice, EPA, https://perma.cc/U4L5-U8SY 
(last updated Sept. 26, 2017). 
7. ACS Demographic and Housing Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://perma.cc/4PH7-REZT. 
8. Complaint at 1, Mays v. Snyder, No. 5:15-cv-14002, 2017 WL 445637 (E.D. 
Mich. Feb. 2, 2017), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, reh’g en banc denied sub nom. 
Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391 (6th Cir. 2017) [hereinafter Complaint]. 
9. Mays, 2017 WL 445637, at *3. 
10. Jiquanda Johnson, Lawyers to Appeal Dismissal of Flint Water Crisis 
Lawsuit, MLIVE (Feb. 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/3QVF-LXXP. 
11. Mays was consolidated on appeal with Boler v. Earley, No. 16-10323, 2016 
WL 1573272 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 19, 2016). Earley, 865 F.3d at 400, 417. The 
Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal and held that plaintiffs’ Section 1983 
bodily integrity claim in Mays was not precluded by the Safe Drinking Water 
Act. Id. at 409. In its decision, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that the statute’s 
text and lack of a comprehensive remedial scheme, as well as the divergent 
contours of the rights and protections found in the constitutional claim, 
cannot imply that Congress intended to foreclose the Section 1983 bodily 
integrity claim with the Safe Drinking Water Act. Id. at 403–10. 
12.  Following the issuance of its decision, the Sixth Circuit received and denied 
a petition for rehearing en banc. Id. at 391. As of the date of this Note’s 
publishing, neither party has filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
3
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officials from the City of Flint, the Michigan Department of 
Environmental Quality (“MDEQ”), and the State of Michigan.13 
This Note examines the merits of the “bodily integrity” claim 
that the Flint residents have alleged in Mays (but does not discuss 
any claims asserted in Earley, the case Mays was consolidated with 
on appeal), and asserts that they should be successful on this claim 
on remand, assuming that the facts alleged in the Flint residents’ 
complaint are true. This Note outlines the alleged facts and then 
discusses the existing case law on bodily integrity claims generally, 
both in the non-environmental justice and environmental justice 
fields. Following is an explanation of the specific bodily integrity 
claim the Flint residents have made and an application of the 
existing case law (from both the non-environmental justice and 
environmental justice fields) to the alleged facts. Lastly, this Note 
compares this federal Flint case to the parallel Flint-related state 
class action suit filed with the Michigan Court of Claims. 
Although there might be some legal hurdles that the Flint 
residents will have to overcome, their bodily integrity claim can be 
successful on remand and will likely not be precluded by federal 
statute if appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. As a result, similar 
bodily integrity claims should be used as a remedy for 
contamination of other public drinking water sources across the 
country. The Flint residents should be able to establish that: (1) 
defendants’ actions occurred “under color of state law,” and (2) a 
constitutional right exists and was deprived.14 The Flint residents 
can best establish this by showing that defendants’ conduct was 
“outrageous and shocking” to the point where it “shocks the 
conscience” of the judiciary, as the defendants’ actions exhibited 
“deliberate indifference” to plaintiffs’ rights to clean water.15 On 
remand, no deference should be given to the district judge’s initial 
dismissal of the case because the district court made virtually no 
findings of fact and did not consider the merits of whether 
defendants actually violated the Flint residents’ established 
 
13. Complaint, supra note 8, at 5–10. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the 
Flint residents’ claims against the State of Michigan because it is 
sovereignly immune from such claims under the Eleventh Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution. Earley, 865 F.3d at 413.  
14.  Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981). 
15.  Lucero v. Detroit Public Schools, 160 F. Supp. 2d 767, 798–99 (E.D. Mich. 
2001). 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss1/3
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constitutional right to bodily integrity. Within the environmental 
justice context specifically, the magnitude of defendants’ intrusion 
on plaintiffs’ bodily integrity rights far outweighs the public health 
benefit (if there is any in this case) and its innocuous effect on the 
Flint residents resulting from defendants’ actions.16 
Although two state cases, which deal with the addition of 
fluoride to public water systems, disadvantage environmental 
justice bodily integrity claims like that asserted in the federal Flint 
case, other fluoride cases counter—and overcome—the force of 
these two state cases. Additionally, the Michigan Court of Claims’s 
decision can further bolster the Flint residents’ claim on remand 
that they have established a prima facie 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 
1983”) case against defendants—as required under the second 
element (that a constitutional right exists and was deprived)—
because the court held that defendants’ actions “shock the 
conscience.”17 Also, the possibility of the Court of Claims denying 
a damage remedy to the Flint residents is not an issue because the 
Flint residents will likely be successful in suing defendants in their 
individual capacities. The Flint residents can overcome the 
argument that defendants are entitled to “qualified immunity” 
from being sued in their individual capacities because they can 
establish that: (1) the facts, considered in the light most favorable 
to the Flint resident, demonstrate a constitutional violation; and 
(2) the constitutional right is “clearly established.”18 
II. SUMMARY OF ALLEGED FACTS FROM THE 
COMPLAINT 
The Flint residents allege that City of Flint officials 
commissioned a study in 2011 to determine if the Flint River could 
be used by the City as its primary source of drinking water (in 
anticipation of switching from the Detroit water system to an 
alternative system governed by a regional water authority to cut 
costs).19 The report found that the Flint River water was highly 
corrosive and could not be consumed safely without an anti-
 
16.  Minn. State Bd. of Health by Lawson v. City of Brainerd, 241 N.W.2d 624, 
633 (Minn. 1976). 
17.  Mays v. Snyder, No. 16-000017-MM, at 28 (Mich. Ct. Cl. Oct. 26, 2016). 
18.  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2001). 
19.  Complaint, supra note 8, at 16. 
5
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corrosive agent to prevent lead, copper, and other heavy metals 
from leaching from the lead-, copper-, and iron-based water lines.20 
In 2013, Flint officials delivered this report to the MDEQ, warning 
the MDEQ of these dangers.21 That same year, the Flint City 
Council approved the switch to the alternative system governed by 
a regional water authority and scheduled the new water source to 
become operational in 2016.22 In the meantime, water from Detroit 
would be made available to Flint until the transition was 
complete.23 Despite this, in April 2014, the Flint Emergency 
Manager ordered the City to draw water from the Flint River, even 
though he knew that the corrosive River was not being treated with 
anti-corrosive agents.24 
Within days of the switch, the Flint residents immediately 
complained to the City of Flint and the MDEQ, citing the water’s 
unusual smell, color, and taste.25 Despite these repeated 
complaints over an eight-month period—and the fact that 
defendants were made aware in April 2014 that anti-corrosive 
treatments were not being used—the City and the MDEQ 
continually assured residents that the water was safe to drink.26 
Additionally, MDEQ and City officials were aware of elevated 
levels of Trihalomethanes (“TTHM”) in the tap water above legal 
Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”) levels (and residents were 
made aware of this by mail as well).27 Despite this, the Flint 
Emergency Manager continued to deny that the water was unsafe 
and did not do anything about it.28 In January 2015, the 
Emergency Manager resigned, but his replacement likewise failed 
to do anything about the corrosive water.29 
During this same eight-month period, MDEQ officials knew of 
the high lead levels and that inaccurate test results were providing 
false assurances to residents about true lead levels (they were also 
informed of this by an EPA representative in June 2015 and by 
 
20.  Id. 
21.  Id. 
22.  Id. 
23.  Id. 
24.  Id. at 16–17. 
25.  Id. at 17. 
26.  Id. at 17–18. 
27.  Id. at 18. 
28.  Id. 
29.  Id. at 19. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss1/3
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Flint officials throughout the entire eight months).30 Various 
landmark studies and reports released during the spring and 
summer of 2015 also showed that Flint River water levels exceeded 
legal SDWA limits and that the water was having adverse health 
effects on the Flint residents.31 Flint also did not keep any records 
of which users had or did not have lead service pipes or plumbing—
a direct violation of federal law.32 In October 2015, Governor 
Snyder ordered that Flint reconnect its water source to the Detroit 
water system.33 Despite the reconnection, the Flint residents 
continued to experience adverse health effects and still do at the 
time of this Note’s writing and publication.34 
The Flint residents filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of Michigan in November 2015.35 In the 
interim, the Flint residents moved to amend the complaint, both 
parties moved to add parties, and defendants moved to extend 
response time.36 In late June 2016, Governor Snyder and two other 
state officials named as defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which 
the district court then granted in February 2017.37 The Flint 
residents subsequently appealed to the Sixth Circuit,38 which 
reversed the dismissal and remanded the case to the district court 
for further proceedings on the merits.39 It remains to be seen 
whether either party will appeal the case to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 
 
30.  Id. at 20. 
31.  Id. at 20–21. 
32.  Id. at 21. 
33.  Id. at 22. 
34.  Id. 
35.  Id. at 1. 
36.  We Have Subpoenaed Documents on Behalf of the Class, FLINT WATER CLASS 
ACTION, https://perma.cc/85W5-HX2B. 
37.  Johnson, supra note 10. 
38.  Id. 
39.  Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391, 396 (6th Cir. 2017). 
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III. THE CASE LAW ON “BODILY INTEGRITY” 
CLAIMS 
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bodily Integrity Generally 
The bodily integrity claim in the federal Flint case derives 
from Section 1983. This section of the U.S. Code enables a person 
to be compensated when another person, acting “under color of 
state law,” deprives this person of a federal constitutional right.40 
In order to establish a prima facie case under Section 1983, 
plaintiffs must establish that: (1) the action occurred “under color 
of state law” and (2) that a constitutional right exists and was 
deprived.41 Meeting the first element is not difficult in cases where 
those who are sued are government employees or entities who were 
acting within their governmental duties and powers.42 The U.S. 
Supreme Court has held that the first element pertains to 
government actors—those who “carry a badge of authority of a 
State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in 
accordance with their authority or misuse it.”43 Such actors also 
include “municipalities and other government units.”44 
Aggrieved parties can assert violations of Substantive Due 
Process constitutional rights under Section 1983 (from the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution), regardless of how fair the procedures used to 
implement the government actions at issue were.45 In general, 
Substantive Due Process violations successfully brought under 
Section 1983 have been limited to “matters relating to marriage, 
family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity.”46 Similarly, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has been reluctant to expand the scope of 
these Substantive Due Process rights.47 This historically narrow 
approach also applies to one’s implied right to bodily integrity. This 
implied right derives from one’s fundamental privacy right under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, in the sense that nothing is more 
 
40.  15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 72 (2016). 
41.  Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981). 
42. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1985). 
43. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961). 
44. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 
45. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990). 
46.  Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994). 
47. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss1/3
  
116 Pace Environmental Law Review [Vol. 35 
important to life and liberty than a person’s health and their 
ability to control it.48 Most of the case law on this topic relates to 
sexual assault, medical autonomy, and children, but 
environmental justice scholars assert that, under certain 
circumstances, substantive due process rights extend to polluting 
activity in the form of a toxic trespass to one’s bodily integrity.49 
The key inquiry in determining whether one’s fundamental 
right to bodily integrity has been violated is whether the alleged 
actions were “outrageous and shocking” to the point where they 
“shock the conscience” of the judiciary.50 When a government 
official has an opportunity beforehand to deliberate over their 
committed act, the judiciary will be “shocked” if that “official acts 
in a way that exhibits deliberate indifference to others’ rights.”51 
An aggrieved party can satisfy “deliberate indifference” if they can 
prove that the official disregarded an obvious “risk of harm” that 
will likely result in a violation of a constitutional right.52 
In order to rebut the “outrageous and shocking” inquiry, the 
government must “provide more than minimal justification for its 
action.”53 This is true because, unlike most deprivations of 
property, bodily invasions most often cannot be remedied by simply 
awarding the injured party money damages.54 Because the damage 
is often permanent in these situations, a crucial factor in providing 
more than a minimal justification is whether the action involved 
“needless severity” that caused a “risk of irreversible injury to 
health and danger to life itself.”55 
B. Bodily Integrity Claims in the Environmental 
Justice Context 
Another approach courts have used to evaluate bodily 
integrity claims in the environmental justice context is to balance 
 
48.  Uma Outka, Environmental Injustice and the Problem of the Law, 57 ME. L. 
REV. 209, 248 (2005). 
49. Id. at 250. 
50. Lucero v. Detroit Public Schools, 160 F. Supp. 2d 767, 799 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 
51. Waller v. Tripett, 179 F. Supp. 2d 724, 731 (E.D. Mich. 2001), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part sub nom. Waller v. Trippett, 49 F. App’x 45 (6th Cir. 2002). 
52. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994). 
53. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 813 (S.D. Ohio 1995). 
54. Id. 
55.  Id. at 814. 
9
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the substantial public health benefit and its innocuous effect on 
the individual with the magnitude of the intrusion on one’s bodily 
integrity.56 To perform this balancing test—“the Minnesota State 
Board of Health balancing test”—the court must consider four 
factors: (1) the importance of the state’s purpose for requiring the 
environmentally harmful action; (2) the nature and magnitude of 
the effect of the action on the individual; (3) whether the state’s 
purpose justified intrusion of bodily integrity; and (4) whether the 
means adopted by the state to accomplish its purpose were proper 
and reasonable.57 
In addition to the Minnesota State Board of Health balancing 
test, the court must also consider whether the potential for a bodily 
integrity violation through exposure to an environmental harm is 
only “speculative” (which weighs against a bodily integrity 
violation) or is a risk of harm likely to result in exposure (which 
weighs in favor of a bodily integrity violation).58 The burden is on 
the Flint residents to prove a risk of harm that is likely to result in 
exposure.59 Environmental justice advocates believe this burden is 
unfair and places an inappropriate presumption in favor of profit-
driven polluters because proving the “potential” of the harm to 
create a “risk of harm likely to result” in exposure creates a 
seemingly insurmountable uncertainty problem.60 Additionally, 
bodily integrity is not coextensive with the right to be free from 
someone acting “under color of state law” (a government actor) who 
introduces an allegedly contaminated substance into public 
drinking water.61 Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not 
weighed in on this issue specifically, federal courts throughout the 
country have been consistently clear that the U.S. Constitution 
does not provide the right to a contaminant-free environment.62 
 
56.  Minn. State Bd. of Health by Lawson v. City of Brainerd, 241 N.W.2d 624, 
633 (Minn. 1976). 
57.  Id. at 631. 
58. Lucero v. Detroit Public Schools, 160 F. Supp. 2d 767, 800 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 
59. Outka, supra note 48, at 251. 
60.  Id. 
61. Coshow v. City of Escondido, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19, 31 (Ct. App. 2005). 
62. Concerned Citizens of Neb. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 970 F.2d 
421, 426–27 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding no fundamental right to be free of non-
naturally occurring radiation); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 475 F. 
Supp. 928, 934 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (finding no constitutional right to a healthful 
environment based on spraying foliage with chemical agents); Gasper v. La. 
Stadium & Exposition Dist., 418 F. Supp. 716, 721 (E.D. La. 1976) (finding 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss1/3
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IV. THE FLINT RESIDENTS’ BODILY INTEGRITY 
CLAIM 
The Flint residents’ main claim is that defendants violated 
Section 1983 because their actions unconstitutionally invaded 
upon the Flint residents’ implied fundamental right to “bodily 
integrity,” as established by Substantive Due Process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.63 Overall, the Flint residents claim that 
defendants violated this right because defendants: (1) had a “duty 
to protect” the Flint residents from “foreseeable risk of harm” from 
the Flint River’s contaminated water; (2) “knew of serious medical 
risks” from exposure to this contaminated water; (3) “failed to 
protect” the Flint residents from these known risks; and (4) the 
Flint residents “suffered bodily harm as a result of [this] 
exposure.”64 
Additionally, the Flint residents claim that defendants’ 
conduct was “so egregious and outrageous that it shocks the 
conscience.”65 This is because, in the Flint residents’ view, 
defendants made a conscious and deliberate decision to continually 
expose Flint residents to toxic water while ignoring the serious 
medical risks of doing so for over eighteen months.66 Lastly, the 
Flint residents claim that, as both direct and proximate results of 
defendants’ unconstitutional acts, they have suffered serious—and 
in some cases, life-threatening and irreversible—bodily injury, 
emotional turmoil, and substantial economic losses (in the form of 
medical expenses and lost wages from time missed at work).67 
 
 
 
no fundamental right to breathe clean air free of tobacco smoke); Molly 
McNulty, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Statute, 
Ordinance, or Other Measure Involving Fluoridation of Public Water Supply, 
78 A.L.R. 6th 229, § 7 (2012). 
63.  Complaint, supra note 8, at 26. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 2, 26. 
66.  Id. at 26. 
67. Id. at 26–27. 
11
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V. APPLYING THE CASE LAW TO THE ALLEGED 
FACTS OF THE FEDERAL FLINT CASE 
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bodily Integrity Generally – A 
Positive Result 
When the existing case law is applied to the facts alleged in 
the complaint in the federal Flint case, it is evident that the bodily 
integrity claim can be viable on remand. If the dismissal of the case 
is appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, plaintiffs will be able to 
affirm that their bodily integrity claim is not precluded by the 
SDWA. Conversely, if the case is not appealed on the preclusion 
issue and is instead remanded to the district court in accordance 
with the Sixth Circuit’s opinion, the Flint residents can establish 
a prima facie Section 1983 case against defendants (that (1) the 
action occurred “under color of state law,” and (2) that a 
constitutional right exists and was deprived). Although the Flint 
residents might run into problems satisfying the second element, 
the facts of the case seem to satisfy the first element of the case 
law so definitively as to outweigh the potential problems with 
meeting the second element. 
The first element is met because all defendants, as stated in 
the complaint, are employees of the State of Michigan or the City 
of Flint and acted “under color of state law” within their 
governmental duties and powers.68 The second element might 
present issues because of how narrow the Supreme Court has 
defined bodily integrity (and fundamental rights in general) from 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in the 
past.69 As discussed above, there is no established fundamental 
right to be free from someone introducing an allegedly 
contaminated substance into public drinking water.70 
Although this is the case, the second element can be bolstered 
by the notion that defendants’ actions qualify as “outrageous and 
shocking.” This is because defendants acted in a way that exhibits 
“deliberate indifference” to the Flint residents’ rights to clean 
 
68.  Id. at 2. Issues of immunity are further discussed infra Section VII but 
should not present an issue in meeting this first element. 
69. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). 
70. Coshow v. City of Escondido, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19, 29 (Ct. App. 2005). 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss1/3
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water.71 “Deliberate indifference” is defined as when the “state 
official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to [the victim’s] 
health or safety.”72 Defendants repeatedly ignored various 
complaints made by the Flint residents for eighteen months and 
several warnings made over the same time period by the EPA, the 
Flint-commissioned water study, and other high-profile 
publications.73 One of these publications, completed during the 
spring and summer of 2015 by Professor Marc Edwards of Virginia 
Tech, found that 10% of the samples taken from the Flint River 
had lead levels of twenty-five parts per billion—substantially in 
excess of the federal limit of fifteen parts per billion—and that the 
Flint River water was nineteen times more corrosive than the 
water pumped from Lake Huron by the Detroit water system.74 
Another such study, published in August 2015 by Dr. Mona 
Hanna-Attisha of Hurley Children’s Hospital in Flint, Michigan, 
found a dramatic and dangerous spike in blood lead levels in many 
Flint children corresponding with the time of exposure to the 
highly corrosive Flint River water.75 Both of these studies were 
seemingly ignored by defendants in their decision to continually 
expose the Flint residents to lead-contaminated water from the 
Flint River to the point where it could be classified as “deliberate 
indifference.” 
Moreover, defendants knew that they did not have any record 
of which users did or did not have lead service pipes or plumbing, 
yet still ensured residents that the water was safe.76 In further 
spite of this knowledge, defendants also repeatedly decided to not 
treat the water with anti-corrosive agents.77 Through these 
actions, defendants disregarded an obvious “risk of harm” likely to 
result in a possible violation of bodily integrity.78 The deleterious 
effects, especially to children, of prolonged lead exposure are well 
 
71.  Lucero v. Detroit Public Schools, 160 F. Supp. 2d 767, 798 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 
72.  Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 513 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting 
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837(1994)). 
73. Complaint, supra note 8, at 2, 16–18. 
74. Id. at 20. 
75. Id. at 21. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 17–19. 
78. Lucero v. Detroit Public Schools, 160 F. Supp. 2d 767, 789 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 
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documented.79 Also, defendants were continually informed of this 
risk—both before and after they decided to switch to the Flint 
River as Flint’s main source—yet did nothing about it.80 
Defendants also will likely not be able to offer “more than 
minimal justification for [their] action[s].”81 Such a justification is 
necessary here because the Flint residents, many of whom have 
suffered permanent bodily harm, cannot simply be compensated 
like most other deprivations of property.82 Defendants decided to 
use the Flint River as a drinking source primarily to cut costs.83 
Defendants had the option to continue receiving water from Detroit 
in the interim while Flint transitioned to a new regional authority, 
but refused to take advantage of this option.84 Additionally, 
arguing that the Flint River water was safe is not valid because 
defendants were repeatedly warned to the contrary.85 The 
“severity” of the effects of defendants’ actions was “needless”86 
(meaning that defendants’ decision to switch to the Flint River, and 
the resulting negative effects, were both avoidable) because 
defendants only needed to use the Detroit interim option to avoid 
this harm altogether. Instead, this unnecessary severity led to an 
unjustifiable “risk of irreversible injury to health and danger to life 
itself.”87 
B. Bodily Integrity Claims in the Environmental 
Justice Context – Another Positive Result 
The four factors of the Minnesota State Board of Health 
balancing test also lean in favor of the Flint residents and 
constitute an alternative argument the Flint residents can make 
to assert that their bodily integrity rights were violated. In terms 
of factor (1) (the importance of the State’s purpose for requiring the 
 
79. Lead – Childhood Lead Poisoning Data, Statistics, and Surveillance, CTR. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Sept. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/P93B-
TAXB. 
80. Complaint, supra note 8, at 17–19. 
81. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 813 (S.D. Ohio 1995). 
82. Complaint, supra note 8, at 22. 
83. Id. at 16. 
84. Id. at 16–17. 
85. Id. at 16–18, 20. 
86. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. at 814. 
87. Id. 
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environmentally harmful action), saving on costs was arguably the 
only reason why the state’s purpose for committing this 
environmentally harmful action was important.88 
In terms of factor (2) (the nature and magnitude of the effect 
of the action on the individual), the nature and magnitude of the 
effect is significant. Victims have suffered—and continue to 
suffer—immense physical damage and injury in the form of skin 
lesions and hair loss, chemically induced hypertension, 
autoimmune disorders, neurological disorders like “brain fog,” 
seizure, vision loss, and memory loss, and psychological disorders 
like depression, chronic anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, 
and an inability to cope with normal stress.89 Victims also have 
suffered—and continue to suffer—chronic and acute abdominal 
and stomach discomfort,90 chronic and acute respiratory disorders 
like chronic rhinitis and aggravation of asthma,91 and an inability 
to overcome (or a worsening of) developmental disorders.92 
Additionally, victims have experienced—and continue to 
experience—substantial economic losses in the form of property 
damage and decreased property value from irreparably damaged 
service line pipes,93 medical expenses,94 and lost wages from time 
missed at work due to illness.95 Compared to Minnesota State 
Board of Health (where there was actually a public benefit through 
fluoridation of a public water source),96 the federal Flint case poses 
a substantial health risk without any public benefit. Additionally, 
compared to Minnesota State Board of Health (where fluoridation 
of a public water source only caused innocuous effects on 
individuals),97 the lead in the federal Flint case has caused 
significant effects on the individuals in Flint. 
In terms of factor (3) (whether the State’s purpose justified 
intrusion of bodily integrity), the State’s purpose, as discussed in 
 
88. Complaint, supra note 8, at 16. 
89.  Id. at 11. 
90.  Id. at 12. 
91. Id. at 13. 
92. Id. at 15. 
93. Id. at 11. 
94. Id. at 25. 
95. Id. at 27. 
96. Minn. State Bd. of Health by Lawson v. City of Brainerd, 241 N.W.2d 624, 
633 (Minn. 1976). 
97.  Id. 
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factor (1), does not justify intrusion of bodily integrity. In terms of 
factor (4) (whether the means adopted by the State to accomplish 
its purpose were proper and reasonable), the means adopted to 
achieve factor (1) were not “proper and reasonable.”98 Defendants 
continually ignored sound advice and warnings without any 
adequate justification for doing so.99 Switching to another water 
source would have been a simple fix, but defendants continually 
chose not to resolve the problem.100 
Furthermore, these four factors demonstrate that the Flint 
residents can show that they were continually exposed to a risk of 
harm likely to result in exposure, not merely a “speculative” 
danger.101 This is mainly because the health effects in the federal 
Flint case are well documented and have persisted for over a year. 
These are not simply projected health risks. 
VI. COMPARABLE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
CASES TO THE FEDERAL FLINT CASE 
A. Lucero v. Detroit Public Schools – A Favorable 
Outcome in the Eastern District of Michigan 
One environmental justice case that parallels favorably to the 
federal Flint case in the same jurisdiction is Lucero v. Detroit 
Public Schools, where the Detroit Board of Education decided to 
construct a new elementary school on a known contaminated 
site.102 The new school consolidated two elementary schools, one of 
which had a student body that was 61% Hispanic and 13% African 
American, and the other 21% Hispanic and 58% African 
American.103 The Board proceeded with the plan, despite a 
recently published University of Michigan study that found that 
the site could have a significant presence of many toxins, including 
volatile organic compounds (“VOCs”), polychlorinated biphenyls 
 
98.  Id. at 631. 
99.  Complaint, supra note 8, at 16–18, 20. 
100. Id. 
101. Lucero v. Detroit Public Schools, 160 F. Supp. 2d 767, 800 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 
102. Id. at 771. 
103. Id. 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss1/3
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(“PCBs”), chlorinated solvents, heavy metals, radioactive paints, 
semi-VOCs, and petroleum-related materials.104 
The Eastern District of Michigan (the same court that 
dismissed the federal Flint case here) held that, although the 
plaintiffs properly asserted a bodily integrity right, the defendants’ 
actions did not constitute an invasion of bodily integrity in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.105 The court quoted 
Lillard v. Shelby County Board of Education, where the Sixth 
Circuit stated that, while a student has a Fourteenth Amendment 
right to personal security and bodily integrity, there must be a 
showing that the “force applied caused injury so severe, was so 
disproportionate to the need presented, and was so inspired by 
malice or sadism rather than merely careless or unwise zeal that 
it amounted to a brutal and inhuman abuse of official power 
literally shocking to the conscience.”106 The court reasoned that the 
plaintiffs had not shown that the defendants’ actions were based 
in “malice or sadism,” and that their actions fell short of the 
outrageous and shocking character required because the harm to 
the students of the new school was speculative at that time, rather 
than actual and imminent.107 Additionally, the court reasoned that 
the site at issue that has already been found to be contaminated, 
not the school facility itself, may have caused the injury.108 
This outcome, although unfavorable to the Lucero plaintiffs, 
favorably compares to the federal Flint case. In the federal Flint 
case, plaintiffs can argue on remand that the risks of bodily harm 
were more genuine and probable than in Lucero because multiple 
studies documented the adverse health effects on the Flint 
residents from defendants’ actions and because, on multiple 
occasions, several groups notified defendants of these risks.109 In 
Concerned Pastors for Social Action v. Khouri, a related case about 
the same Flint water crisis, the same district court acknowledged 
these severe health risks as uncontested.110 Additionally, as 
 
104. Id. at 773. 
105. Id. at 799. 
106. Id. (quoting Lillard v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 725 (6th Cir. 
1996)). 
107. Id. at 799. 
108. Id. at 805. 
109. Complaint, supra note 8, at 16–18, 20. 
110. No. 16-10277, 2016 WL 6647348, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 10, 2016). 
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discussed above, the Flint residents in the federal Flint case have 
already suffered many severe health effects as a direct result of 
defendants’ actions for over a year. When Khouri was appealed, the 
Sixth Circuit confirmed this by denying the stay of the granting of 
a preliminary injunction requiring defendants to provide city 
residents with safe drinking water at point of use111: “Flint 
residents continue to suffer irreparable harm from the lack of 
reliable access to safe drinking water.”112 In Lucero, plaintiffs only 
asserted severe potential health risks and could not offer any proof 
of actual health effects because students had yet to attend the new 
school and suffer from chemical exposure. 
B. The Fluoride Additive Cases – A Surmountable 
Mixed Result 
An issue that typically arises in bodily integrity challenges, as 
evidenced by the cases discussed below, is the addition of fluoride 
to public water for health benefits.113 Although groups have 
brought bodily integrity claims, courts have held that there is no 
fundamental right to fluoride-free public drinking water to the 
point where a heightened standard of review applies.114 This does 
not severely detract from the Flint residents’ argument on remand, 
though, and should not preclude other aggrieved parties in other 
Flint-like environmental justice cases from successfully asserting 
that their bodily integrity rights were violated. 
One case that exemplifies this is Coshow v. City of Escondido, 
where the plaintiffs argued that fluoridating public water supplies 
was similar to “compulsory mediation”—held by other courts as a 
violation of bodily integrity.115 The court rejected this argument, 
 
111. Concerned Pastors for Soc. Action v. Khouri, 844 F.3d 546, 550 (6th Cir. 
2016). 
112. Id. at 549. 
113. Fluoride in Water - Fluoride in Water is Safe and It Works, AM. DENTAL 
ASS’N, https://perma.cc/CW9K-D54S. 
114. See, e.g., Coshow v. City of Escondido, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19, 27–30 (Ct. App. 
2005) (holding that a right to drinking water uncontaminated with fluoride 
is not explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by either the U.S. or California 
Constitutions); Quiles v. City of Boynton Beach, 802 So. 2d 397, 399 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that inserting fluoride into public drinking 
water is not akin to a “medical procedure” and is therefore not in violation 
of either the U.S. or Florida Constitutions).   
115. 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 31–32. 
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reasoning that a right to fluoride-free public water is not “so rooted 
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental.”116 This holding arguably creates problems for the 
federal Flint case because it is not unreasonable to expect a court 
to hold that lead-free water is likewise not deeply rooted in the 
traditions of our country. This means that the federal Flint case 
might not satisfy the second element of a prima facie Section 1983 
claim (that a constitutional right exists and was deprived) because 
a constitutional right must be deeply rooted in our country’s 
traditions. Thus, there might be no constitutional right to be 
violated in the federal Flint case in the first place. 
However, Coshow is arguably not applicable to the federal 
Flint case because of how outrageous defendants’ conduct was in 
the federal Flint case compared to Coshow. Coshow was based on 
city government conduct involving a widely accepted, statutorily 
mandated addition of fluoride to drinking water for public health 
reasons. Likewise, Michigan state regulation117 and related case 
law118 permit adding fluoride to drinking water for public health 
reasons. In contrast, the federal Flint case involves an attempt to 
conceal deliberate indifference to public danger that defendants 
knew they had created. 
Another case that further illustrates this notion is Quiles v. 
City of Boynton Beach, where the introduction of fluoride into the 
city’s water was held as not akin to a “medical procedure.”119 The 
Quiles court held this because the fluoride is added to the water 
before reaching households, rather than directly into the 
bloodstream—leaving intact the freedom to choose not to ingest the 
fluoride.120 As a result, the plaintiffs were not compelled to ingest 
the fluoride because they could filter the fluoride out of the water, 
boil or distill the water, mix the water with purifying spirits, or 
even purchase bottled drinking water to avoid ingesting the 
fluoride.121 This case also poses a potential issue for the federal 
Flint case. Like fluoride additives, it is not unreasonable for a court 
 
116. Id. at 28 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750–51 (1987)). 
117. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.12721 (1978). 
118. See Rogowski v. City of Detroit, 132 N.W.2d 16, 24 (Mich. 1965); Hastings 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Safety King, Inc., 778 N.W.2d 275, 281 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009).  
119. Quiles, 802 So. 2d at 399. 
120. Id.  
121. Id.  
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to hold that lead in water is not a “medical procedure” because 
nowhere in the complaint does it allege that defendants directly 
inserted lead into the bloodstream of the Flint residents. The Flint 
residents did have options other than ingesting the lead-
contaminated water and had the freedom to pursue these options, 
if desired.122 
Although these two above fluoride cases may disadvantage 
environmental justice bodily integrity claims like the one in the 
federal Flint case, other fluoride cases bolster these bodily 
integrity claims to the point where these two cases do not present 
much of an issue. Additionally, these two fluoride cases are state 
cases, meaning that the federal district court has no obligation to 
follow this persuasive—not binding—precedent on remand when 
considering the merits of the bodily integrity claim. A case that can 
support the federal Flint case is Attaya v. Town of Gonzales, where 
the court (like the cases above) held that adding fluoride did not 
violate bodily integrity.123 Despite this holding, this case is 
important for its reasoning. In Attaya, the court reasoned that 
fluoridation was constitutionally permissible because it was 
merely adding mineral properties to the water that were already 
found “naturally” in some sections of the country.124 The federal 
Flint case significantly differs in this regard because, unlike 
fluoride, lead is a human-induced additive not “naturally” found in 
the Flint River or in any water body across the country.125 Also, 
lead has only negative health effects on humans when added to 
public water,126 whereas fluoride can provide some added health 
 
122. Id. 
123. Attaya v. Town of Gonzales, 192 So. 2d 188, 193 (La. Ct. App. 1966). 
124. Id. at 192. 
125. Basic Information about Lead in Drinking Water, EPA, 
https://perma.cc/L9NR-B3Z5 (last updated Aug. 21, 2017).  
126. Mona Hanna-Attisha et al., Elevated Blood Lead Levels in Children 
Associated with the Flint Drinking Water Crisis: A Spatial Analysis of Risk 
and Public Health Response, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 283 (2016), 
https://perma.cc/CY82-HKUG (discussing how lead is a potent neurotoxin 
and can impact many developmental and biological processes during 
childhood, especially intelligence, behavior, and overall quality of life). 
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benefits if ingested in drinking water by humans,127 which 
Michigan state-level case law has upheld.128 
Another advantageous fluoride case is the case establishing 
the Minnesota State Bd. of Health by Lawson balancing test. In 
that case, the court held that fluoridation also did not violate bodily 
integrity, but reasoned that the substantial health benefit (the 
importance of the state purpose) outweighed the innocuous effect 
on the individual and the small intrusion on one’s bodily integrity 
rights (the nature and magnitude of the effect on the individual).129 
As discussed above, the facts of the federal Flint case, when applied 
to these four factors, favor the Flint residents. In the federal Flint 
case, there is a substantial public health risk of consuming lead-
contaminated water (versus a potential public health benefit of 
adding fluoride to drinking water in Minnesota State Board of 
Health), a significant effect on the individual of consuming lead 
(versus an innocuous effect of consuming fluoride in Minnesota 
State Board of Health), and an intrusion on one’s bodily integrity 
rights that is large in magnitude (versus small in magnitude in 
Minnesota State Board of Health).   
Although some environmental justice cases within the fluoride 
context do not apply favorably to the federal Flint case, the overall 
body of environmental justice case law does. It allows the Flint 
residents to successfully assert on remand that they have a 
fundamental right to bodily integrity which was violated, because 
the Flint crisis is particularly “outrageous and shocking” when 
compared factually to other environmental justice cases. 
VII. INSIGHTS FROM MAYS V. SNYDER – PARALLEL 
MICHIGAN COURT OF CLAIMS FLINT CASE 
A subset of the federal plaintiffs filed a parallel suit at around 
the same time in the State of Michigan Court of Claims against 
three of the defendants from the federal case (Governor Rick 
 
127. AM. DENTAL ASS’N, supra note 113 (discussing how fluoride is safe, prevents 
tooth decay in at least 25% of children and adults, and is an effective source 
of cavity protection). 
128. See Rogowski v. City of Detroit, 132 N.W.2d 16, 24–28 (Mich. 1965); 
Hastings Mut. Ins. Co. v. Safety King, Inc., 778 N.W.2d 275, 281 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 2009). 
129. Minn. State Bd. of Health by Lawson v. City of Brainerd, 241 N.W.2d 624, 
633 (Minn. 1976). 
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Snyder, Darnell Earley, and Jerry Ambrose).130 In this state Flint 
case, the Flint residents also asserted that their fundamental due 
process right to bodily integrity had been unconstitutionally 
violated, but under Michigan’s state constitution.131 Although this 
case is at the state level, it nevertheless supports the remanded 
federal bodily integrity claim, considering that: 1) the district court 
sits in the same state in which the state claim was filed, and 2) this 
case derives from a very similar set of facts from the same Flint 
water crisis. 
Before the Court of Claims were dual motions seeking 
summary disposition pursuant to Michigan statutory law; one was 
brought by the state defendants (Governor Rick Snyder) and the 
other by the former emergency managers (Darnell Earley and 
Jerry Ambrose).132 In its decision rendered in late October 2016, 
the court denied summary disposition as to all defendants, without 
prejudice, for the bodily integrity claim.133 The court’s holdings 
with respect to establishing a bodily integrity constitutional tort 
and the availability of a damage remedy—and the court’s 
reasoning for them—can further bolster the federal bodily integrity 
claim on remand, considering that the Michigan due process 
provision is “coextensive with the federal provision.”134 
A. Establishing the Constitutional Bodily Integrity 
Tort – A Potential Benefit 
The court’s discussion of establishing the constitutional tort of 
bodily integrity supports the federal Flint case such that the 
district court should find on remand that the Flint residents’ 
constitutional bodily integrity rights have been violated. In this 
way, this case can further bolster the Flint residents’ claim that 
they have established the second element of a prima facie Section 
1983 case against defendants—that a constitutional right exists 
and was deprived. 
Under Michigan law, the Flint residents must plead sufficient 
facts that, if proven, establish that the state officials’ actions were 
 
130. Mays v. Snyder, No. 16-000017-MM, at 1 (Mich. Ct. Cl. Oct. 26, 2016).   
131. Id. at 1–2. 
132. Id. at 2. 
133. Id. 
134. People v. Sierb, 456 Mich. 519, 523 (1998). 
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so arbitrary that they “shock the conscience”135—an identical 
burden to that which the Flint residents bear for federal bodily 
integrity claims. In its opinion, the Michigan Court of Claims 
agreed with the Flint residents that defendants’ actions shock the 
conscience.136 The court reasoned that the defendants decided to 
switch to the Flint River as the source of drinking water, despite 
their awareness of the dangers the water posed and the state’s 
failure to conduct a scientific assessment of the suitability of the 
Flint River water by that point.137 The court also reasoned that 
defendants intentionally concealed data and made false 
statements to downplay the health risks of using the water, even 
though they had data to the contrary.138 The Flint residents in the 
federal Flint case can use these same arguments—now backed by 
on-point case law from the same state on the same set of facts—to 
bolster its argument on remand. 
In this discussion, the court also addressed Coshow (discussed 
above), which defendants used to argue that the Flint residents 
have not properly asserted that defendants violated their bodily 
integrity rights.139 Although Coshow could weaken the federal 
bodily integrity claim—because the right to lead-free water is not 
deeply rooted in our nation’s traditions (as discussed above)—the 
court distinguishes the state Flint case from Coshow by arguing 
that Coshow, and the cases it relied on, did not address 
“circumstances even remotely similar to those present in this 
case.”140 In other words, the facts of Coshow precluded that court 
from addressing whether bodily integrity rights are implicated 
when “state actors allegedly abuse state police powers by 
knowingly and intentionally delivering drinking water 
contaminated with . . . dangerous levels of lead to a discrete 
population and thereby create a public health emergency.”141 
Therefore, the Michigan Court of Claims in the state Flint case did 
not find Coshow to be persuasive. If defendants in the federal case 
 
135. Mays., No. 16-000017-MM at 28 (citing Mettler Walloon, LLC v. Melrose 
Twp., 761 N.W.2d 293, 304–07 (2008)).  
136. Id. at 28. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 29. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
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were to use this pivotal environmental bodily integrity case (which 
is likely, as these defendants are also defendants in the federal 
case), the district court, on remand, may invoke the Michigan 
Court of Claims’s rationale—and hold that the Flint residents have 
successfully asserted the existence and violation of a federal 
constitutional bodily integrity right. 
B. Availability of a Damage Remedy – A Potential 
Drawback That Can Be Overcome 
The Michigan state court’s discussion of the availability of a 
damage remedy might reduce the federal Flint case’s likeliness of 
satisfying element one of their prima facie Section 1983 case. This 
is because the Flint residents have sued defendants in different 
capacities in each of the state and federal cases. But, this drawback 
can be overcome. In the state case, the Flint residents sued the 
three defendants mentioned above (Snyder, Earley, and Ambrose) 
in their official capacities only,142 whereas in the federal case, the 
Flint residents sued Snyder, Earley, Ambrose, and others 
exclusively in their individual capacities or in their individual as 
well as official capacities.143 In the state case, the Court of Claims 
held that “a damage remedy for the constitutional tort alleged” 
should be recognized because no other remedy is available to the 
Flint residents.144 The court reasoned that a suit against 
defendants for monetary damages under Section 1983 for violating 
constitutional rights cannot be maintained in a federal or state 
court against a state or state official sued in his or her official 
capacity due to Eleventh-Amendment immunity.145 In other 
words, all defendants in the state case are not “persons” under 
Section 1983 and have “sovereign immunity” under the Eleventh 
Amendment.146 
The issue this presents for the federal plaintiffs is that, for all 
defendants, the Flint residents brought their bodily integrity claim 
against them in their individual capacity or in their individual and 
 
142. Id. at 33. 
143. Amended Complaint at 7–15, Mays v. Snyder, No. 16-000017-MM, at 28 
(Mich. Ct. Cl. Oct. 26, 2016). 
144. Mays, No. 16-000017-MM at 43. 
145. Id. at 36 (citing Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365 (1990)).  
146. Id. at 42. 
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official capacities. As a result, the U.S. Supreme Court, if the case 
is appealed, could take the stance that the Flint residents do, in 
fact, have alternative remedies available to them for all 
defendants. By suing these defendants in their individual 
capacities, the Flint residents in the federal case avoid the 
Eleventh Amendment immunity issues presented when suing a 
defendant only in their official capacity under Section 1983. 
Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court might not find it appropriate 
on appeal to offer a damage remedy to the Flint residents in the 
federal case if they can instead obtain relief by suing defendants in 
their individual capacities. The Court of Claims acknowledged this 
but decided to not comment on the merits of the federal claim.147 
The Flint residents in the federal case can, however, overcome 
this issue on remand, as it is likely that they will succeed through 
this other available remedy. Since the Flint residents in the federal 
case are suing all defendants in their individual capacities, all 
defendants are claiming “qualified immunity” in response, which 
protects government officials from being sued unless they “are 
plainly incompetent or . . . knowingly violate the law.”148 In order 
to assert that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity, 
the Flint residents must establish that: (1) the facts, considered in 
the light most favorable to the Flint residents, demonstrate a 
constitutional violation; and (2) the constitutional right is “clearly 
established.”149 The Flint residents have likely met the first 
element because they can successfully assert that their bodily 
integrity rights were violated (as discussed above). 
The Flint residents have also likely met the second element 
because they can assert that the “contours of the right” are 
sufficiently clear that a “reasonable official” would have fair 
warning to understand that her actions violate that right.150 Also, 
the Flint residents can satisfy this without proving that the specific 
actions in question have previously been held unlawful.151 Due to 
defendants’ direct involvement in the incident, and their repeated 
disregard for information provided to them about the health risks 
of using the Flint River, it will be difficult for defendants to argue 
 
147. Id. at 41. 
148. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). 
149. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2001). 
150. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 270 (1997). 
151. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). 
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that a reasonable person in their positions did not or should not 
have known that the Flint residents would be subject to harm. 
Because the Flint residents can meet both elements, 
defendants will likely not have qualified immunity on remand, 
meaning that the Flint residents can successfully sue defendants 
in their individual capacities.152 The sovereign immunity issue 
present in the state case should therefore not be problematic for 
the federal Flint residents for the first element of their prima facie 
Section 1983 bodily integrity case. Moreover, the Michigan Court 
of Claims noted in its opinion that its holding on whether 
defendants were sovereignly immune from these claims could 
change, depending on how the federal case comes out on whether 
the relief sought by the Flint residents is only “prospective” or 
something more.153 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
By applying the relevant case law to the facts of the federal 
Flint case, and by comparing the federal Flint case to the above-
discussed environmental justice cases, the bodily integrity claim 
should succeed on remand. If the case is appealed to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the Flint residents would likely be able to affirm 
the holding that the SDWA does not preclude their bodily integrity 
claim. Even though the Flint residents can assert this, they could 
have trouble on remand establishing that a constitutional right 
exists, especially given some of the fluoride cases discussed above. 
Yet, it is a challenge that the Flint residents can overcome, 
considering how favorably the facts apply to existing case law in 
the bodily integrity and environmental justice contexts. 
 
152. The Sixth Circuit discussed the issue of qualified immunity in its opinion 
but decided not to affirm the district court’s dismissal of the case on that 
basis. Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391, 416 (6th Cir. 2017). The court concluded 
this because it acknowledged that applying the facts to both elements of the 
qualified immunity test would involve ruling on the merits of the 
constitutional bodily integrity claim, which it left to the district court to 
determine on remand. Id. at 416–17. 
153. Mays v. Snyder, No. 16-000017-MM, at 35 n.11 (Mich. Ct. Cl. Oct. 26, 2016). 
In its opinion, the Sixth Circuit discussed how the relief sought by the Flint 
residents is “prospective,” as the relief’s main purpose is to direct the 
Governor to provide services to those affected by the crisis itself, not simply 
cost the state money. Earley, 865 F.3d at 412. As a result, the court held that 
only the State of Michigan was sovereignly immune from the bodily integrity 
claim, not the Governor or any other state defendant. Id. at 413–14.  
26https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss1/3
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Additionally, the parallel case from the Michigan Court of Claims 
further supports the Flint residents’ argument and strongly 
suggests a favorable outcome for the federal claim. Moving 
forward, bodily integrity claims can continue to provide relief to 
victims of the Flint water crisis and in other similar environmental 
justice crises nationwide. The prospects are good that bodily 
integrity claims can provide victims with an adequate remedy and 
can help mitigate the disproportionately high level of harm 
minority populations in this country face in the wake of 
environmental disasters.154 
 
 
154. EJOLT, supra note 1; ENERGY JUSTICE NETWORK, supra note 1. 
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